Scientific discovery is a key element of the knowledge-seeking process in all disciplines. It is what sets the stage for a series of experiments, observations and interpretations that may lead to the development of new hypotheses. It is what allows us to move from a theory of a phenomena to a theory that is capable of producing precise predictions about those phenomena. It is what allows us to move from the level of phenomena to the level of causes. It is what makes it possible to move from a description of the effects to a description of the forces that produce them, and from there to a description of the compounds, ingredients or mechanisms that bring them about.
Until recently, however, the treatment of scientific discovery by philosophers has largely been one of non-inferential, mystical processes that cannot be rationally reconstructed. This has led many to conclude that theories of mental operations and heuristic procedures have no place in philosophy of science and that the study of scientific discovery is not a legitimate topic for philosophical inquiry.
In the last few decades, this conventional view has been challenged and re-evaluated. A number of approaches have been developed that combine philosophical analysis of the process of having and articulating ideas with empirical research on human cognition. These studies draw on a wide range of resources including experimental work in cognitive science and psychology, as well as in vivo observations and brain imaging techniques. The resulting philosophies of scientific discovery generally treat the contexts of discovery and justification differently than did the conventional view in the early 20th century, and they usually conceive of two rather than three contexts.
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